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Abstract
We define reachability games based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), where the players’ actions
are finely described as DEL action models. We first consider the setting where an external controller
with perfect information interacts with an environment and aims at reaching some epistemic goal
state regarding the passive agents of the system. We study the problem of strategy existence for
the controller, which generalises the classic epistemic planning problem, and we solve it for several
types of actions such as public announcements and public actions. We then consider a yet richer
setting where agents themselves are players, whose strategies must be based on their observations.
We establish several (un)decidability results for the problem of existence of a distributed strategy,
depending on the type of actions the players can use, and relate them to results from the literature
on multiplayer games with imperfect information.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory; Computing
methodologies → Reasoning about belief and knowledge; Computing methodologies → Planning
under uncertainty; Computing methodologies → Multi-agent planning; Computing methodologies
→ Multi-agent systems
Keywords and phrases Dynamic Epistemic Logic, game theory, imperfect information, planning
1 Introduction
Many applications fall within the scope of reachability games with imperfect information,
such as video games [15] (Civilization, etc.), Kriegspiel (the epistemic variant of Chess) [25],
Hanabi [3], or contingent and conformant planning [20].
Games with imperfect information are computationally hard, and even undecidable for
multiple players [29]. One way to tame this complexity is to make assumptions on how the
knowledge of the different players compare: if all players that cooperate can be ordered in a
hierarchy where one knows more than the next, a situation called hierarchical information,
then the existence of distributed strategies can be decided [28, 7]. Another natural approach
is to consider fragments based on classes of action types, as done for instance in [32, 6, 11]
where different kinds of public actions are considered. But the usual graph-based models of
games with imperfect information, where the players’ actions are modelled as labels on the
edges, make it difficult to define subtle properties of actions.
Public announcements Public actions Propositional actions Full
Plan NP-c PSPACE-c decidable undecidable
Controller PSPACE-c (Th. 12) EXPTIME-c (Th. 13) decidable (Th. 14) undecidable
undecidable (Th. 20)
Distributed strategy PSPACE-c (Th. 21) EXPTIME-c (Th. 22)
decidable case (Th. 23)
undecidable
Table 1 Known results (new in grey) for plan, controller and distributed strategy synthesis.
2 Reachability Games in Dynamic Epistemic Logic
By contrast, Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) [38] was designed to describe actions pre-
cisely: how they affect the world and how they are perceived. In particular, classic action
types such as public/private announcements or public actions correspond to natural classes
of DEL action models. Also, DEL extends epistemic logic and hence enables modelling
higher-order knowledge, i.e., what an agent knows about what another agent knows etc, and
the evolution of agents’ knowledge over time.
A classification of the complexity with respect to action types was addressed in the
literature of epistemic planning, a problem that asks for the existence of a plan, i.e., a finite
sequence of DEL actions to reach a situation that satisfies some given objective expressed in
epistemic logic. However this problem, which can be seen as solving one-player reachability
games with epistemic objective, has never been considered in a strategic, adversarial context.
This work bridges the gap between DEL and games by introducing adversarial aspects in
DEL planning, thus moving from plan generation to strategy synthesis. We define two
frameworks for DEL-based reachability games, where players start in a given epistemic
situation and their possible moves are described by action models, and the objective is to
reach a situation satisfing some epistemic formula.
In a first step we consider open systems [21], i.e., systems that interact with an en-
vironment. In our setting, two omniscient, external entities (that we call controller and
environment) choose in turn which actions are performed. We call this setting DEL con-
troller synthesis. Here, agents involved in the models and formulas are not active, they
merely observe how the system evolves based on the actions chosen by the controller and
the environment, and update their knowledge accordingly. DEL controller synthesis extends
DEL planning, as the latter is a degenerate case of the former where the environment stays
idle, and we therefore inherit undecidability for the general case. Nevertheless we show
that, as for DEL planning, decidability is regained when actions do not increase uncertainty
(so-called non-expanding actions) or when the preconditions of actions are propositional
formulas. More precisely, we show Pspace-completeness when possible moves are public
announcements, Exptime-completeness for the more general public actions, and member-
ship in (k+1)-Exptime for propositional actions when the objectives are formulas of modal
depth at most k.
We then generalise further this setting by turning agents into players. Unlike the omni-
scient controller of the former setting, agents have imperfect information about the current
state of the game, and can only base their decisions on what they know. In the theory of
games with imperfect information this is modelled by the notion of uniform strategies, also
called observation-based strategies [1]. We study the problem of distributed strategy syn-
thesis, where a group of players cooperate to enforce some objective against the remaining
players. As for multi-player games with imperfect information the problem is undecidable,
already for propositional actions and a coalition of two players. However we show that the
two kinds of assumptions that make imperfect-information games decidable, namely public
actions and hierarchical information, also yield decidable cases of multiplayer DEL games.
Furthermore, in the case of public announcements and public actions, the complexity is not
worse than for controller synthesis.
Related work
The complexity of DEL-based epistemic planning has been thoroughly investigated. It is
undecidable already for actions with preconditions of modal depth one and propositional
postconditions [9, 22]. For preconditions of modal depth one and no postconditions the
problem has been open for years, but it is decidable when pre- and postconditions are
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propositional [39, 2, 16]. It is also known to be NP-complete for public announcements [10,
14], and Pspace-complete for public actions [14].
The decidability for propositional actions has been extended in [2] by considering infinite
trees of actions called protocols instead of finite plans, and specifications in branching-time
epistemic temporal logic instead of reachability for epistemic formulas; this has been ex-
tended further in [16] by enriching the specification language with Chain Monadic Second-
order Logic. Both results rely on the fact that when actions are propositional, the infinite
structures generated by repeated application of action models form a class of regular struc-
tures [2, 26], i.e., relational structures that have a finite representation via automata. First-
order logic is decidable on such structures [8], and chain-MSO is decidable on a subclass
called regular automatic trees [16], but neither of these logics can express the existence of
strategies in games. However we will show that the regular structures obtained from propos-
itional DEL models can be seen as finite turn-based game arenas studied in games played
on graphs. This allows us to transfer decidability results on games with epistemic temporal
objectives to the DEL setting.
A notion of cooperative planning in DEL has been studied in [17], but without the
adversarial aspect of games. Also, in [23], a game setting has been developed with the so-
called Alternating-time Temporal Dynamic Epistemic Logic, but it does not consider uniform
strategies and thus cannot express the existence of distributed strategies. Our controller
synthesis problem can be expressed in this logic, but not in the fragment that they solve,
which cannot express reachability. On the other hand, several decidability results for logics
for strategic and epistemic reasoning have been established recently [5, 27], but they do not
offer the fine modelling of actions possible in DEL. For instance they cannot easily model
public announcements, which we show yield better complexity than those obtained in their
settings.
Table 1 sums up previous results for epistemic planning, as well as the results established
in this contribution.
2 Background in epistemic planning
Let us fix a countable set of atomic propositions AP.
2.1 The classic DEL setting
We recall models of epistemic logic [19].
◮ Definition 1. An epistemic model M = (W, (Ra)a∈Agt, V ) is a tuple where
W is a non-empty finite set of possible worlds (or situations),
Ra ⊆W ×W is an accessibility relation for agent a, and
V : W → 2AP is a valuation function.
We write wRau instead of (w, u) ∈ Ra; its intended meaning is that when the actual world
is w, agent a considers that umay be the actual world. The valuation function V provides the
subset of atomic propositions that hold in a world. A pair (M, w) is called a pointed epistemic
model, and we let |M| be the size ofM, defined as |W |+
∑
a∈Agt |Ra|+
∑
w∈W |V (w)|. We
will only consider finite models, i.e., we assume that V (w) is finite for all worlds.
The syntax of Epistemic Logic LEL is given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∨ ϕ) | Kaϕ
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where p ranges over AP and a ranges over Agt.
Kaϕ is read ‘agent a knows that ϕ is true’. We define the usual abbreviations (ϕ1∧ϕ2) for
¬(¬ϕ1∨¬ϕ2) and Kˆaϕ for ¬Ka¬ϕ, and use LProp for the fragment of LEL with propositional
formulas only. The modal depth of a formula is its maximal number of nested knowledge
operators; for instance, the formula KaKbp ∧ ¬Kaq has modal depth 2. The size |ϕ| of a
formula ϕ is the number of symbols in it.
The semantics of LEL relies on pointed epistemic models.
◮ Definition 2. We define M, w |= ϕ, read as ‘formula ϕ holds in the pointed epistemic
model (M, w)’, by induction on ϕ, as follows:
M, w |= p if p ∈ V (w);
M, w |= ¬ϕ if it is not the case that M, w |= ϕ;
M, w |= (ϕ ∨ ψ) if M, w |= ϕ or M, w |= ψ;
M, w |= Kaϕ whenever for all u such that wRau, M, u |= ϕ.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) relies on action models (also called “event models”).
These models specify how agents perceive the occurrence of an action as well as its effects
on the world.
◮ Definition 3. An action model A = (A, (RAa )a∈Agt, pre, post) is a tuple where:
A is a non-empty finite set of possible actions,
RAa ⊆ A×A is the accessibility relation for agent a,
pre : A→ LEL provides the precondition for an action to be performed, and
post : A×AP → LProp provides the postcondition (i.e., the effects) of an action.
A pointed action model is a pair (A, α) where α represents the actual action. We let |A| be
the size of A, defined as |A| := |A|+
∑
a∈Agt |R
A
a |+
∑
α∈A |pre(α)|+
∑
α∈A,p∈AP |post(α, p)|.
An action α is executable in a world w of an epistemic model M if M, w |= pre(α),
and in that case we define V (w,α) := {p ∈ AP | M, w |= post(α, p)}, the set of atomic
propositions that hold after occurrence of action α in world w. Since postconditions are
always propositional, we can define similarly V (v, α) where v ⊆ 2AP is a valuation.
Types of actions
We identify noticeable types of actions. An action model A is propositional if all pre- and
postconditions of actions in A belong to LProp. A public action is a pointed action model
A, α such that for each agent a, RAa is the identity relation. A public announcement is a
public action A, α such that for all p, post(α, p) = p.
We recall the product that models how to update an epistemic model when an action is
executed [4].
◮ Definition 4 (Product [4]). Let M = (W, (Ra)a∈Agt, V ) be an epistemic model, and
A = (A, (RAa )a∈Agt, pre, post) be an action model. The product of M and A is defined
as M⊗A = (W ′, (Ra)′, V ′) where:
W ′ = {(w,α) ∈ W ×A | M, w |= pre(α)},
(w,α)R′a(w
′, α′) if wRaw
′ and αRAa α
′, and
V ′((w,α)) = V (w,α).
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α : pre : ppost : p ← ⊥ α
′ : pre : ⊤post : /
b
a a, b
A
M
w : {p}
u : ∅
a, b
a, b
a, b
(w,α) : ∅ (w,α′) : {p}
(u, α′) : ∅
b
b
a
a, b
a, b
a, b
M⊗A
Figure 1 Example of DEL product. Symbol / indicates the trivial postcondition that leaves
valuations unchanged.
◮ Example 5. Figure 1 shows the pointed model M, w that represents a situation in which
p is true and both agents a and b do not know it. The pointed action model A, α describes
the action where agent a learns that p was true but that it is now set to false, while agent b
does not learn anything (she sees action α′ that has trivial pre- and postcondition). In the
product epistemic modelM⊗A, (w,α), agent a now knows that p is false, while b still does
not know the truth value of p, or whether agent a knows it.
An epistemic model (resp. an action model) is S5 if all accessibility relations are equival-
ence relations. This property is important to model games with imperfect information, and
we will assume it in Section 4.
2.2 Generated structure
Iteratively executing an action model from an initial epistemic model generates an infinite
sequence of epistemic models, whose union yields an infinite epistemic structure where dy-
namics are represented by the possible sequences of actions, while information is captured
by the accessibility relations.
◮Definition 6 (Generated structure). GivenM = (W, {Ra}a∈Agt, V ) an epistemic model and
A = (A, {RAa }a∈Agt, pre, post) an action model, we define the family of disjoint epistemic
models {MAn}n≥0 by letting MA0 = M and MAn+1 =MAn ⊗A. We finally define the
infinite epistemic model MA∗ =
⋃
n∈NMA
n.
In the following we identify objects of the form (. . . ((w,α1), α2), . . . αn) with (w,α1, . . . , αn).
Anticipating the game setting we later define, we call a play an infinite sequence π =
wα1α2 . . . such that all finite prefixes of π are in MA∗. A history is a finite prefix h of a
play. We let PlaysMA∗(w) and HistMA∗(w) be, respectively, the set of all plays and histories
in MA∗ that start with w. These definitions entail the following.
◮ Lemma 7. For every world (w,α1, . . . , αn) ∈ M⊗An, and every formula ϕ ∈ LEL,
M⊗An, (w,α1, . . . , αn) |= ϕ iff MA
∗, wα1 . . . αn |= ϕ.
This shows that the alternative definition of epistemic planning given in the next section
is equivalent to the usual one.
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2.3 Epistemic planning
The epistemic planning problem asks for the existence of an executable sequence of des-
ignated actions α1, . . . , αn in an action model A, whose execution from M, w leads to a
situation satisfying some objective expressed as an epistemic logic formula. Formally, we
consider the following problem.
◮ Definition 8 (Plan existence problem).
Input: a pointed epistemic model M, w, an action model A and an objective formula
ϕ ∈ LEL;
Output: yes if there is a history h in HistMA∗(w) such that MA
∗, h |= ϕ.
◮ Remark 9. Note that usual formulations of the plan existence problem consider a set of
distinct pointed action models (A1, α1), . . . , (An, αn) instead of one action model A. Both
formulations are equivalent, in the sense that they are interreducible in linear time.
Main known results on the plan existence problem are summarised in Table 1, while the
relevant pointers to the literature are given in the related work paragraph of the introduction.
We recall some standard notions and notations that we will need in the rest of the paper.
A finite (resp. infinite) word over some alphabet Σ is an element of Σ∗ (resp. Σω). The
length of a finite word w = w0w1 . . . wn is |w| := n + 1, and last(w) := wn is its last letter.
Given a finite (resp. infinite) word w and 0 ≤ i < |w| (resp. i ∈ N), we let wi be the
letter at position i in w, w≤i := w0 . . . wi is the prefix of w that ends at position i and
w≥i := wiwi+1 . . . is the suffix of w that starts at position i. We also use variables x that
range over some finite domain. We will write (x = d) for the fact “the value of x is d”,
and use x := d for the effect of setting x to value d. This can all be encoded with atomic
propositions.
3 Controller synthesis
We first generalise the plan existence problem to the setting where some environment may
perturb the execution of the plan that should thus be robust against it.
Formally, we consider an initial epistemic model M, as in Definition 1, with an initial
world wι, and an action model A = (A, (RAa )a∈Agt, pre, post) whose set of actions A is
partitioned into actions in Actr controlled by a Controller and actions in Aenv controlled by
the Environment.
Controller and Environment play in turn: in each round, Controller first chooses to ex-
ecute an action in Actr, then Environment chooses to execute an action in Aenv. Thus instead
of seeking a history in MA∗ that reaches an objective formula, as in epistemic planning,
one seeks a strategy for Controller: formally, it is a partial function σ : HistMA∗(wι)⇀ Actr
defined on histories of odd length (when it is the controller’s turn). An outcome of a
strategy σ is a play π = wια1α2 . . . in which the controller follows σ, i.e., for all i ∈ N,
α2i+1 = σ(π≤2i) ∈ Actr, while the other actions, of the form α2i+2, are selected by the
environment. A strategy σ for Controller is winning for an objective formula ϕ ∈ LEL if for
every outcome π of σ, there exists i ∈ N s.t. MA∗, π≤i |= ϕ.
◮ Definition 10 (The controller synthesis problem).
Input: a pointed epistemic model M, wι, action model A with A = Actr ⊎ Aenv, and an
objective ϕ ∈ LEL;
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procedure controllerSynthesisPublicAnnouncements(M, wι, A, A = Actr ⊎ Aenv, ϕ)
set M, wι as the current pointed epistemic model;
for i := 0 to the number of worlds in M do
if the current pointed epistemic model satisfies ϕ then accept ;
if i is even then existentially choose α ∈ Actr that is executable in the
current pointed epistemic model (fail if no such action exists);
if i is odd then universally choose α ∈ Aenv that is executable in the current
pointed epistemic model (fail if no such action exists);
set M⊗A, (w,α) as the current pointed epistemic model, where M, w was
the previous current pointed epistemic model
reject
Figure 2 Alternating algorithm for deciding in polynomial-time the controller synthesis problem
when actions are public announcements.
Output: yes if there exists a winning strategy for Controller for objective ϕ; no otherwise.
◮ Remark 11. Formally, we define and study the problem of existence of a strategy. We take
the liberty to call the problem controller synthesis because all the algorithms we provide
can produce a winning strategy whenever there exists one. The same remark applies to the
distributed strategy synthesis problem defined in the next section.
As the plan existence problem reduces to the controller synthesis problem, the undecidab-
ility of the former entails the one of the latter. We next establish that in all known subcases
where the plan existence problem is decidable, so is the controller synthesis problem.
3.1 The case of non-expanding action models
We consider so-called non-expanding action models where actions do not expand epistemic
models when executed, like public actions. For this type of actions, the search space is finite
and thus the problem is decidable. We establish the precise computational complexity of
the problem in these cases.
◮ Theorem 12. When actions are public announcements, the controller synthesis problem
is Pspace-complete.
Proof. Since applying public announcements to epistemic models only removes worlds, and
does not change those that remain, the number of successive public announcements to con-
sider can be bounded by the number of worlds in the initial epistemic model. We can thus
solve the problem with an alternating algorithm that runs in polynomial time, guessing ex-
istentially actions of the controller and universally those of the environment. The algorithm
is given in Figure 2.
We conclude by recalling that alternating polynomial time corresponds to deterministic
polynomial space [13]. Note that checking epistemic formulas (preconditions and ϕ) in epi-
stemic models, and thus also computing the update product, can be performed in polynomial
time.
PSPACE-hardness comes from a polynomial reduction from TQBF (True Quantified
Boolean Formulae) which is PSPACE-complete [35]. A QBF formula
∃p1∀p2 . . . ∃p2k−1∀p2kχ(p1, . . . , p2k)
is transformed in the following instance of the controller existence problem:
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M is the pointed Kripke model made up of a {qi}-world and {pi}-world for all i ∈
{1, . . . , 2k} and an extra ∅-world w, which is the pointed world; the epistemic relation
for agent a is universal;
w : ∅
...
...
w1 : {p1} u1 : {q1}
w2 : {p2} u2 : {q2}
w2k : {p2k} u2k : {q2k}
The possible announcements are
ϕ¬pi =
i−1∧
j=1
Ka¬qj ∧
2k∧
j=i
Kˆaqj ∧ ¬pi ∧ ¬qi and ϕpi =
i−1∧
j=1
Ka¬qj ∧
2k∧
j=i
Kˆaqj ∧ ¬qi
for i ∈ {1, . . . , 2k}.
They belong to the controller when i is odd, and to the environment when i is even;
The goal is
∧2k
j=1 Ka¬qj ∧ χ(Kˆap1, . . . , Kˆap2k).
In the model M, worlds wi are used to encode assignments of truth values to atoms pi:
removing world wi means setting pi to true, while keeping it means setting pi to false.
Worlds ui, bearing atoms qi, are used to enforce that the value of each atom pi is set exactly
once. In announcements ϕpi and ϕ¬pi , conjunct
∧i−1
j=1 Ka¬qj∧
∧2k
j=i Kˆaqj implies that worlds
u1, . . . , ui−1 have already been removed, while worlds ui, . . . , u2k are still in the model. Thus
announcements ϕpi and ϕ¬pi are possible in round i, and only there.
Now observe that announcement ϕ¬pi , because of conjunct ¬pi∧¬qi, removes both world
wi and world ui, thus setting pi to true. Announcement ϕpi instead removes only world ui,
thus setting pi to true.
In the goal formula,
∧2k
j=1 Ka¬qj means that all the variables p1, . . . , p2k have been
assigned. The clause χ(Kˆap1, . . . , Kˆap2k) is the formula χ(p1, . . . , p2k) in which we replaced
pi by Kˆapi, which holds if and only if world wi has not been removed by announcements,
i.e., if and only if announcement ϕpi was chosen at round i.
The fact that the announcements that assign values to p1, p3, . . . are assigned to the con-
troller and that the announcements that assign values to p2, p4, . . . are played by the environ-
ment reflects the alternation of quantifiers in the formula ∃p1∀p2 . . .∃p2k−1∀p2kχ(p1, . . . , p2k).
◭
◮ Theorem 13. The controller synthesis problem for public actions is Exptime-complete.
Proof. As for public announcements, applying a public action in a model does not add
worlds. However it may change facts in worlds, so that sequences of actions of linear length
may not suffice. Nonetheless, linear space is enough to store the current pointed epistemic
model, and we can turn the alternating algorithm from the proof of Theorem 12 into one that
runs in polynomial space. The new algorithm is given in Figure 3, in which we do not bound
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procedure controllerSynthesisPublicActions(M, wι, A, A = Actr ⊎ Aenv, ϕ)
set M, wι as the current pointed epistemic model;
i := 0;
while the current pointed epistemic model does not satisfy ϕ do
if i is even then existentially choose α ∈ Actr that is executable in the
current pointed epistemic model (fail if no such action);
if i is odd then universally choose α ∈ Aenv that is executable in the current
pointed epistemic model (fail if no such action);
set M⊗A, (w,α) as the current pointed epistemic model, where M, w was
the previous current pointed epistemic model;
i := 1− i;
accept
Figure 3 Alternating algorithm for deciding in polynomial-space the controller synthesis problem
when actions are public actions.
the length of the sequence of actions. Note that the algorithm may not terminate, but it is
folklore that we can add a counter to ensure termination while staying in polynomial-space;
we do not present these tedious technicalities here.
The Exptime-membership of the problem follows from the fact that alternating polyno-
mial space corresponds to exponential time [13].
Exptime-hardness is obtained by reduction from the conditional planning problem, a
variant of classical planning with full observability and non-deterministic actions, where
the plan should lead to a situation satisfying the goal no matter how nondeterminism is
resolved. However the plan can depend on how nondeterminism is resolved, hence the name
“conditional plan” [24, 34].
Stated in our terms, conditional planning essentially corresponds to a particular case of
controller synthesis which is purely boolean (no epistemic content), but where actions chosen
by the controller have nondeterministic effects, and the environment resolves nondetermin-
ism. Since everything is purely boolean, the initial situation is a one-world epistemic model,
i.e., a valuation over a finite set of atoms AP, the goal is a boolean formula over AP, and
each action is a one-state action model with nondeterministic postcondition. A conditional
plan is then a winning strategy for the controller. Thus, to finish the reduction, we only
have to show how to simulate nondeterministic actions in our setting.
In [24, 34], a nondeterministic action is modelled as a tuple 〈ϕ,
−−→
post〉 where ϕ is a Boolean
precondition, and
−−→
post is a finite set {post1, . . . ,postn}, where posti : AP → LProp is a
postcondition. The idea is that in each round the controller chooses an action among those
whose precondition is true, and the environment resolves the non-determinism by choosing
which postcondition of
−−→
post to apply to the current valuation. For each nondeterministic
action 〈ϕ, {post1, . . . ,postn}〉 of the conditional planning instance, we create one action
model for the controller that stores in a finite-domain variable action which action has
been played, and n actions for the environment that correspond to the different possible
poscondtions. The action for the controller is defined as follows:
pre : ϕ
post : action := 〈ϕ,
−−→
post〉
while the actions for the environment are, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
pre : action = 〈ϕ,
−−→
post〉
post : post
i
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This finishes the proof, and also shows how the controller synthesis problem subsumes
conditional planning. We now present an alternative proof that reduces from a more basic
decision problem called G4, introduced by Chandra and Stockmeyer [36]. This is essentially
an adaptation of the proof from [24] for the EXPTIME-hardness of conditional planning.
The input to the G4 problem is a 13-DNF formula over 2k atomic propositions p1, . . . , pk,
q1, . . . , qk and an initial valuation. Atoms p1, . . . , pk are controlled by the controller (the
existential player) while q1, . . . , qk are controlled by the environment (the universal player).
Now, the following game is played: each player, when it is her turn to play, flips the assign-
ment of one of the variables she controls, and turns alternate. The game stops when the
13-DNF formula becomes true, and the winner is the player that made the last move. An
instance of the G4 problem is positive if the controller has a winning strategy.
We construct the following instance of our controller synthesis problem. The initial
epistemic model is made up of one world, whose valuation is the initial valuation of G4.
Actions of the controller are:
pre : ⊤
post : p1 := ¬p1
. . .
pre : ⊤
post : pk := ¬pk
Actions of the environment are:
pre : ⊤
post : q1 := ¬q1
. . .
pre : ⊤
post : qk := ¬qk
The goal is the 13-DNF formula. ◭
Theorem 13 also generalises to other non-expanding actions models such as the so-called
separable action models [14], where the preconditions of any two actions in the same connec-
ted component are logically inconsistent.
3.2 The case of propositional action models
To solve our controller synthesis problem we rely on the approach followed in [26] to solve the
plan existence problem for propositional actions. This approach has two main ingredients:
(I1) when A is propositional, the generated structure MA∗ can be represented finitely, and
(I2) one can decide the existence of a winning strategy in a certain class of two-player games
with epistemic objectives.
◮ Theorem 14. When action models are propositional, the controller synthesis problem is
decidable, and in (k + 1)-Exptime if the objective’s modal depth is bounded by k.
We devote the rest of this section to prove Theorem 14, which requires to introduce
particular game arenas.
◮ Definition 15. A two-player epistemic game arena is a structure
G = (W,wι,∆, (Ra)a∈Agt, V ) where (W, (Ra)a∈Agt, V ) is an epistemic model, W =W0 ⊎W1
is partitioned into the positions of players 0 and 1, wι is an initial world and ∆ ⊆ W ×W
is a transition relation.
A play in a game arena G is an infinite sequence of worlds π = w0w1w2 . . . such that for
all i ∈ N, wi∆wi+1, and a history is a finite nonempty prefix of a play. We let PlaysG and
HistG be the sets of plays and histories in G, respectively. Accessibility relations (Ra)a∈Agt
are extended to histories to interpret epistemic formulas: two histories h = w0 . . . wn and
h′ = w′0 . . . w
′
m are related by Ra whenever n = m (same length) and wiRaw
′
i for every
i ≤ n.
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A strategy for player 0 is a partial function σ : HistG ⇀ W such that for every h with
last(h) ∈ W0: last(h)∆σ(h). A play π = wιw1w2 . . . is an outcome of σ if for every i ∈ N
with πi ∈ W1, we have πi+1 = σ(π≤i). Strategy σ is winning for an epistemic objective
ϕ ∈ LEL, if for every outcome π of σ there is some i ∈ N with π≤i |= ϕ.
◮ Theorem 16 ([12]). The existence of a winning strategy for player 0 in an epistemic game
G for an epistemic objective ϕ of modal depth k can be decided in time k-exponential in |G|
and |ϕ|.
We show that the controller synthesis problem for propositional action models reduces
to solving an epistemic game:
◮ Proposition 17. Given an instance ((M, wι),A, ϕ) of the controller synthesis problem
where A is propositional, one can construct a game arena G such that Controller wins in
((M, wι),A, ϕ) iff Player 0 wins in G for objective ϕ and |G| ≤ |M|+ |A| × 2
m+1, where m
is the number of atomic propositions involved in M,A and ϕ.
Proof. Let M = (W, (Ra)a∈Agt, V ) and A = (A, {RAa }a∈Agt, pre, post), and let APu be
the atomic propositions involved. The worlds of the game arena G that we build are either
worlds w ∈M or tuples (α, v, i) where α ∈ A represents the last action performed, v ∈ 2APu
is the current valutation, and i ∈ {0, 1} indicates whose turn it is to play: 0 for Controller
and 1 for Environment. In an initial world w, Controller can choose an action α ∈ Actr such
that w |= pre(α) and move to (α, V (w,α), 1); in a world of the form (α, v, i), if i = 1 (resp.,
i = 0), Environment (resp, Controller) chooses an action α′ ∈ Aenv (resp., α′ ∈ Actr) such
that v |= pre(α′), and moves to (α′, V (w,α), 1 − i).
Formally, letting A0 = Actr and A1 = Aenv, we define the epistemic game arena G =
(W ′, wι,∆, (R
′
a)a∈Agt, V
′) as follows: Let W0 = W ∪ A × 2AP × {0}, W1 = A × 2AP × {1},
andW ′ =W0∪W1. For transitions, for w ∈W , α, α′ ∈ A and v, v′ ∈ 2AP , we let w∆(α, v, 1)
if α ∈ Actr, w |= pre(α) and v = V (w,α), and (α, v, i)∆(α′, v′, 1− i) if α′ ∈ Ai, v |= pre(α′)
and v′ = V (v, α). We also let wR′aw
′ if wR′aw
′, and (α, v, i)R′(α′, v′, i) if αRAa α
′, and finally
V ′(w) = V (w) and V ′(α, v, i) = v.
The structure given by the set of histories HistG and relations R
′
a extended to these
histories is isomorphic toMA∗, and histories of odd (resp. even) length inMA∗ correspond
to histories that end in W0 (resp. W1) in G (provided they start in wι). It follows that there
is a winning strategy for Controller in the original problem if and only if there is winning
strategy for Player 0 in G with objective ϕ. ◭
Note that, as stated in Proposition 17, the resulting game arena is indeed polynomial in
the size of the epistemic and action models, but it is exponential in the number of atomic
propositions involved in the problem. This is because states of the game arena contain all
possible valuations. Theorem 14 now follows from Theorem 16 and Proposition 17.
With the controller synthesis problem we enriched epistemic planning with an adversarial
environment. Still, as in epistemic planning, the agents are mere observers. We now make
a step further and make the agents players of the game.
4 Distributed strategy synthesis
In this section agents are no more passive, but instead they are players who choose themselves
the actions that occur. The set Agt of agents is split into two teams Agt∃ and Agt∀ that play
against each other, and we may say players instead of agents.
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4.1 Setting up the game
Unlike the external controller from the previous section, our players now have imperfect
information. The fundamental feature of games with imperfect information is that when a
player cannot distinguish between two different situations, a strategy for this player should
prescribe the same action in both situations. All the additional complexity in solving games
with imperfect information compared to the perfect information setting arises from this
constraint. Such strategies are often called uniform or observation-based (see for instance [33,
37, 1]). Since games with imperfect information consider S5 models, i.e., where accessibility
relations are equivalence relations, and it is unclear what uniform strategies mean in non-S5
models1, we also assume from now on that all epistemic and action models are S5. We stress
this assumption by writing ∼a (resp. ∼Aa ) instead of Ra (resp. R
A
a ).
We start from an initial pointed epistemic model M, w, and an action model A whose
set of actions is partitioned into subsets (Aa)a∈Agt of actions for each player. The game we
describe is turn-based. We use the variable turn ranging over Agt to represent whose turn it
is to play. We require that for each a ∈ Aa, pre(α) implies (turn=a), and that postconditions
for variable turn do not depend on the current world, but instead the next value of turn is
completely determined by the action only.
Moreover, in order to obtain a proper imperfect-information game, we demand the fol-
lowing hypotheses:
Hypotheses on M and A
(H1) The starting player is known: there is a player a such that for all u ∈ W , M, u |=
(turn=a);
(H2) The turn stays known: for all actions α, α′ and agent a, if αRaα
′, then α and α′
assign the same value to turn.
(H3) Players know their available actions: if agent a can execute α after history h, then
she can also execute it after every history h′ with h ∼a h′.
All these hypotheses can be either enforced syntactically or checked in the different
decidable cases we consider in the rest of this work (see the long version for detail).
We now define formally the notion of uniform strategies.
◮ Definition 18 (Uniform strategy). A strategy σ for player a is uniform if for every pair of
histories h, h′ where it is player a’s turn, h ∼a h′ entails σ(h) = σ(h′).
In the rest of this section, a strategy of a player in Agt∃ is implicitly uniform. When one
selects a strategy for each player in Agt∃, the result is called a distributed strategy, and an
outcome of a distributed strategy is a play in which all players in Agt∃ follow their prescribed
strategy. A distributed strategy is winning for an objective formula ϕ if all its outcomes
eventually satisfy ϕ.
4.2 The distributed strategy synthesis problem
We study the existence of a distributed strategy for players in Agt∃ that ensures to reach an
epistemic goal property.
1 Actually the usual definition seems to make sense for KD45, i.e. models whose relations are serial,
transitive, and Euclidean. But this would be highly non-standard, and since all the literature on games
with imperfect information considers S5 models.
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◮ Definition 19 (Distributed strategy existence problem).
Input: a pointed epistemic modelM, w and an action model A partitioned into (Aa)a∈Agt
that satisfy hypotheses (H1)-(H3), and an objective formula ϕ ∈ LEL;
Output: yes if there exists a winning distributed strategy for players in Agt∃; no otherwise.
Unlike the controller synthesis problem which we proved decidable for propositional
actions, synthesising distributed strategies is undecidable for propositional actions, already
for a team of two players.
4.3 Undecidability for two existential players
The following Theorem 20 is a reformulation in our setting of the classical undecidability
result from Reif and Peterson [29]. However, we decide to promote an existing elegant
reformulation of that very same result, called TEAM DFA GAME [15, Def. 1, p. 14:7], that
can be reduced to our distributed strategy synthesis problem.
◮ Theorem 20. The distributed strategy synthesis problem is undecidable, already for a
propositional action model and two existential players against one universal player.
Proof. The proof is given by reduction from the problem TEAM DFA GAME [15, Def. 1,
p. 14:7], shown to be undecidable.
We consider a two-versus-one (players a and b versus player ∀) team game played on a
deterministic finite automaton (DFA) A whose alphabet is {0, 1}, whose set of states is Q,
initial state is q0, transition function δ. Special subsets of states F∃ and F∀ are given. The
game starts with A being in state q0. Each round is divided in six steps:
1. if the current state q is in F∃ then team {a, b} wins; if the current state q is in F∀ then
team {∀} wins;
2. Player ∀ inputs two bits β, β′ into A;
3. Player a learns β;
4. Player a inputs one bit m into A;
5. Player b learns β′;
6. Player b inputs one bit m′ into A.
At each step, player ∀ has perfect information. TEAM DFA GAME is the decision problem:
given an DFA A, subsets of states F∃, F∀, does the team {a, b} have a winning strategy?
The rest of the proof consists in representing the initial situation, the game rules and the
goal of a TEAM DFA GAME instance as a distributed strategy existence problem instance.
Definition of the reduction. Let (A, F∃, F∀) be an instance of TEAM DFA GAME.
Teams are Agt∃ = {a, b} and Agt∀ = {∀}. We introduce a finite-domain variable q that
ranges over the set of states of A. The variable q can be represented by a finite set of
atomic propositions: for example, for an automaton with 8 states from {0,. . . ,7}, three
atomic propositions, bit1(q), bit2(q) and bit3(q) so that say (q = 5) is the Boolean formula
bit1(q) ∧ ¬bit2(q) ∧ bit3(q). We prefer to keep with a finite-domain variable q to avoid
technicalities.
We also introduce a finite-domain variable stp that ranges over {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. The
Boolean variable lost is true if the team Agt∃ has lost. We define M, w to be the single-
world S5 epistemic model in which (turn=∀), (q=q0), (stp=1), ¬lost. The actions in A∀ form
an a- and b-indistinguishably equivalence class and are of the form:
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pre: (turn=∀) ∧ (stp=1) ∧ q∈F∀; post: lost:=⊤, stp:=2
pre: (turn=∀) ∧ (stp=1) ∧ q 6∈F∀; post: stp:=2
pre: (turn=∀)∧(stp=2); post: β:=0, β′:=0, q:=δ(q, 00), turn:=a, stp:=3
pre: (turn=∀)∧(stp=2); post: β:=1, β′:=0, q:=δ(q, 10), turn:=a, stp:=3
pre: (turn=∀)∧(stp=2); post: β:=0, β′:=1, q:=δ(q, 01), turn:=a, stp:=3
pre: (turn=∀)∧(stp=2); post: β:=1, β′:=1, q:=δ(q, 11), turn:=a, stp:=3
Aa is a b-indistinguishably equivalence class and contains:
pre: (turn=a) ∧ (stp=3) ∧ β; post: stp := 4
pre: (turn=a) ∧ (stp=3) ∧ ¬β; post: stp := 4
pre: (turn=a) ∧ (stp=4); post: m:=⊥; stp := 5; q := δ(q, 0); turn := b
pre: (turn=a) ∧ (stp=4); post: m:=⊤; stp:=5; q:=δ(q, 1); turn := b
Ab is an a-indistinguishably equivalence class and contains:
pre: (turn=b) ∧ (stp=5) ∧ β′; post: stp:=6
pre: (turn=b) ∧ (stp=5) ∧ ¬β′; post: stp:=6
pre: (turn=b) ∧ (stp=6); post: m′:=⊥; stp:=1; q:=δ(q, 0); turn:=∀
pre: (turn=b) ∧ (stp=4); post: m′:=⊤; stp:=1; q:=δ(q, 1); turn:=∀
The assignments q := δ(q, 0) and q := δ(q, 1) are shortcuts for some “if statements”
on states, e.g. ‘if q = 5, then q := 2’. For instance, assuming that we have eight states
{s0, . . . , s7} which are thus representable with three bits, the assignment q := δ(q, 0) is
simulated by the following set of propositional assignments: {biti(q) := ψi}i=1..3, where ψi
is the Boolean formula
∨
k∈0..7 s.t. the i-th bit of δ(sk, 0) is 1
(q = sk).
The goal formula ϕ is ¬lost ∧ (stp=1) ∧ (q∈F∃). ◭
We now turn to decidable cases: games with imperfect information and epistemic object-
ives are known to be decidable either when actions are public [6], or when information is
hierarchical [27]. We establish similar results in our setting.
4.4 The case of non-expanding action models
Theorems 12 and 13 of Section 3 generalise to the distributed strategy synthesis problem.
First, we inherit the lower bounds by lettingAgt∃ = {Controller} andAgt∀ = {Environment},
and by making them alternate turns. Second, the upper bounds are obtained by adapting
the alternating algorithms for the upper bounds of Theorems 12 and 13. We need to ensure
that existential choices of actions of an agent a ∈ Agt∃ lead to a uniform strategy. To
do that, every time agent a picks an action α, we perform an extra universal choice over
∼a-indistinguishable worlds, and continue executing the algorithm from these worlds.
◮ Theorem 21. For public announcements, the distributed strategy synthesis problem is
PSPACE-complete.
Proof. The alternating algorithm that runs in polynomial time is similar to the one given
in the proof of Theorem 12, except that we also add universal choices of RAa -successors for
player a in Agt∃. More precisely, the steps of the algorithm works as follows. When it is
the turn of a player a in Agt∀ to play, simply universally guess an executable action in Aa.
When it is the turn of a player a in Agt∃ to play, then perform the following steps:
first existentially guess an executable action α in Aa;
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second, universally guess a Ra-successor of the pointed world in the current epistemic
model and make it as the new pointed world;
compute the new epistemic model by executing the α.
As for Theorem 12, the length of such a sequence is bounded by the number of worlds in
the initial epistemic model M. The obtained algorithm is given in Figure 4.
procedure DistrStratSynthesisPublicAnnouncements(M, wι, A, (Aa)a∈Agt, ϕ)
set M, wι as the current pointed epistemic model;
for i := 0 to the number of worlds in M do
if the current pointed epistemic model satisfies ϕ then accept ;
let a be the agent such that (turn=a) is true in the current pointed epistemic
model;
if a ∈ Agt∃ then
existentially choose α ∈ Aa that is executable in the current pointed
epistemic model (fail if no such action exists);
universally choose an Ra-successor of the pointed world in the cur-
rent epistemic model and make it as the new pointed world;
else if a ∈ Agt∀ then
universally choose α ∈ Aa that is executable in the current pointed
epistemic model (fail if no such action exists);
set M⊗A, (w,α) as the current pointed epistemic model, where M, w was
the previous current pointed epistemic model;
reject
Figure 4 Alternating algorithm for deciding in polynomial-time the distributed strategy synthesis
problem when actions are public announcements.
Hardness follows from Theorem 12 (simply consider the controller as the single agent in
Agt∃, the environment as the single agent in Agt∀, and make them alternate). ◭
◮ Theorem 22. For public actions, the distributed strategy synthesis problem is EXPTIME-
complete.
Proof. The alternating algorithm that runs in polynomial space is similar to the one given
in the proof of Theorem 12. The algorithm is in polynomial space for the same reason said
in the proof of Theorem 13. The obtained algorithm is given in Figure 5.
Hardness follows from Theorem 13. ◭
We now turn to a decidable case for propositional actions.
4.5 Propositional actions+hierarchical information
We consider propositional action models, which may make the size of epistemic models grow
unboundedly, but where the information of the different players is hierarchical, making it
easier to synchronise the existential players’ strategies.
According to Theorem 20, the distributed strategy synthesis problem is undecidable for
propositional actions and a two-player team Agt∃ = {a, b} against team Agt∀ = {∀}. Observe
that in the proof of Theorem 20, the information of players a and b is incomparable: in each
round a only learns the first bit produced by ∀’s move, while b only learns the second
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procedure DistrStratSynthesisPublicActions(M, wι, A, (Aa)a∈Agt, ϕ)
set M, wι as the current pointed epistemic model;
while the current pointed epistemic model does not satisfy ϕ do
let a be the agent such that (turn=a) is true in the current pointed epistemic
model;
if a ∈ Agt∃ then
existentially choose α ∈ Aa that is executable in the current pointed
epistemic model (fail if no such action exists);
universally choose a Ra-successor of the pointed world in the current
epistemic model and make it as the new pointed world;
else if a ∈ Agt∀ then
universally choose α ∈ Aa that is executable in the current pointed
epistemic model (fail if no such action exists);
set M⊗A, (w,α) as the current pointed epistemic model, where M, w was
the previous current pointed epistemic model;
accept
Figure 5 Alternating algorithm for deciding in polynomial-space the distributed strategy syn-
thesis problem when actions are public actions.
bit. This cannot be simulated in games with so-called hierarchical information, a classic
restriction to regain decidability in multi-player games of imperfect information [28, 30].
We say that an input of the distributed strategy synthesis problem ((M, wι),A, ϕ)
presents hierarchical information if the set of Agt∃ can be totally ordered (a1 < . . . < an)
so that ∼ai⊆∼ai+1 and ∼
A
ai
⊆∼Aai+1, for each 1 ≤ i < n.
◮ Theorem 23. Distributed strategy synthesis with propositional actions and hierarchical
information is decidable.
We end the section by sketching the proof of Theorem 23. We start by introducing a
multi-player variant of the epistemic game arenas from Definition 15.
◮ Definition 24. A multi-player epistemic game arena G = (W,wι,∆, (∼a)a∈Agt, V ) is a
structure such that
(W, (∼a)a∈Agt, V ) is an epistemic model,
W = ⊎a∈AgtWa is partitioned into positions of each agent,
wι is an initial world and
∆ ⊆W ×W is a transition relation.
Accessibility relations ∼a are extended to histories, strategies of agent a are required
to be uniform with respect to ∼a, and the notions of outcomes, distributed strategies and
winning distributed strategies are defined as before.
Theorem 23 is established by reducing the distributed strategy synthesis problem to a
similar problem in multi-player epistemic games, known to be decidable:
◮ Theorem 25 ([31, 27]). Existence of winning distributed strategies in multi-player epi-
stemic games with hierarchical information and epistemic temporal objectives is decidable.
The reduction is very similar to the one in the proof of Proposition 17. The main
difference is that we use variable turn instead of bit i ∈ {0, 1} to define the positions of the
different agents. The imperfect information of players is defined based on the accessibility
relations in M and A. More precisely, we can show that:
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◮ Proposition 26. Given an instance ((M, wι),A, ϕ) of the distributed strategy synthesis
problem where A is propositional, one can construct a multi-player epistemic game arena G
such that the distributed strategy synthesis problem is equivalent to the existence of a winning
distributed strategy for Agt∃ to enforce ϕ in G and |G| ≤ |M| + |A| × 2
m, where m is the
number of atomic propositions involved.
Proof. LetM = (W, (∼a)a∈Agt, V ) be an S5 epistemic model, A = (A, {∼Aa }a∈Agt, pre, post)
an S5 propositional event model with A = ⊎a∈AgtAa, and wι ∈W an initial world. Let APu
be the atomic propositions involved.
We define the multiplayer epistemic game arena G = (W ′, wι,∆, (∼′a)a∈Agt, V
′) as follows.
First, let W ′ = W ∪ A × 2AP , and for each a ∈ Agt let W ′a = {w | w |= (turn=a)} ∪
{(α, v) | v |= (turn=a)}. Next, for transitions, we let (w, (α, v)) ∈ ∆ if w |= pre(α) and
v = V (w,α), and ((α, v), (α′, v′)) ∈ ∆ if v |= pre(α′) and v′ = V (v, α). Next, for each
a ∈ Agt, we let ∼′a = ∼a ∪ {((α, v), (α
′, v′)) | (α, α′) ∈ RAa }, and finally V
′(w) = V (w) and
V ′(α, v) = v.
One can see that the structure given by the set of histories HistG and relations ∼′a
extended to these histories is isomorphic to MA∗, and histories that satisfy (turn=a) in
MA∗ correspond to histories that also satisfy (turn=a) in G (provided they start in wι),
and we are done. ◭
5 Perspectives
We have incrementally extended the framework of epistemic planning to a game setting
where players’ actions are described by action models from DEL. We have established fine-
grained results depending on the type of action models.
Works on classical planning that consider game features exist, and they can easily be
located in the landscape of decision problems we have considered. Typically, our controller
(resp. distributed strategy) synthesis problem subsumes conditional planning with full (resp.
partial) observability [34]. Also, conformant planning (partial information where the plan is
a sequence of actions) corresponds to a particular case of our distributed strategy synthesis
problem where Agt∃ = {∃}, Agt∀ = {∀} are singletons, and ∃ is blind, i.e., all actions in A∀
are indistinguishable for her. Blindness and uniformity assumption make that the strategies
of ∃ can be seen as sequential plans.
Moreover, the decision problems we have considered go well beyond classical planning
by addressing, e.g. distributed planning with cooperative or/and adversarial features. We
are thus confronted in a DEL setting to issues usually met in game theory, as witnessed
by the undecidability of the distributed strategy synthesis problem for rather simple action
models (Theorem 20). However, the DEL perspective we propose offers a language to specify
actions (preconditions, postconditions, and epistemic relations between actions) that may
help identifying yet unknown decidable cases.
We note that our results should transfer to Game Description Language, equivalent to
DEL [18].
One interesting extension of the unifying setting of DEL games would be to consider
concurrent games, where players execute actions concurrently, but this will require to first
generalise the product operation of DEL. Another direction would be to consider richer
objectives such as ones expressed in epistemic temporal logic, which can express not only
reachability but also safety or liveness objectives for instance.
Our approach contributes to putting closer the field of multi-agent planning in AI with
the field of multi-player games in formal methods. The setting of DEL games may be
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beneficial to both, allowing the transfer of powerful automata and game techniques from
formal methods to epistemic planning, and bringing in multiplayer games new insights from
the fine modelling offered by DEL.
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